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Abstract
A philosophy of information is grounded in a philosophy of doc-
umentation. Nunberg’s conception of the phenomenon of information
heralds a shift of attention away from the question “What is information?”
toward a critical investigation of the sources and legitimation of the ques-
tion itself. Analogies between Wittgenstein’s deconstruction of philosoph-
ical accounts of meaning and a corresponding deconstruction of philosoph-
ical accounts of information suggest that because the informativeness of a
document depends on certain kinds of practices with it, and because infor-
mation emerges as an effect of such practices, documentary practices are
ontologically primary to information. The informativeness of documents
therefore refers us to the properties of documentary practices. These fall
into four broad categories: their materiality; their institutional sites; the ways
in which they are socially disciplined; and their historical contingency. Two
examples from early modern science, which contrast the scholastic docu-
mentary practices of continental natural philosophers to those of their peers
in Restoration England, illustrate the richness of the factors that must be
taken into account to understand how documents become informing.
The Phenomenology of Information
In his essay, “Farewell to the information age,” Geoffrey Nunberg (1996)
proposes a phenomenology of information. His proposal has important
implications for a philosophy of information. Rather than posit a particu-
lar deﬁnition or argue what the nature of information might be, Nunberg
directs our attention to the manner in which information presents itself at
this particular historical moment. Instead of elaborating a theoretical model
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of the essence of information, Nunberg asks, “How is the impression of ‘in-
formation’ constituted. . . ?” (p. 115). His reason for this approach is that
the ambiguities, contradictions, and confusions inherent in the phenomenon
of information account for its force and authority. Ideas of information that
enjoy the theoretical rigor of deﬁnitions and essences are not useful in un-
derstanding the phenomenon of information, because “any effort to try to
extract a coherent conceptual structure for the notion would be not just fu-
tile but false to its phenomenology: ‘information’ is able to perform the work
it does precisely because it fuzzes the boundaries between several geneti-
cally distinct categories of experience” (p. 114). And the work it performs
is signiﬁcant, because the confusions between different senses of the word
“information”—confusions that constitute information as a phenomenon—
permit, inter alia, information age enthusiasts to use “information” in a sense
“which bears the ideological burden in discussions of the new [information]
technologies,” discussions in which those technologies are believed to “usher
in a new and epochal discursive order” (p. 110). Moreover, because quan-
tiﬁability is one of the phenomenological characteristics of information, we
tend, Nunberg notes, to take seriously such popular claims as “a daily issue
of the New York Times contains more information than the average seven-
teenth-century Englishman came across in a lifetime” (p. 111). Once infor-
mation presents itself in countable bits, we have a resource—the amount of
information—that permits us to denominate not only new experiences, such
as “information anxiety” (Wurman, 1989), but also new socio-historical phe-
nomena such as an “information society,” an “information age,” or an ex-
panding “infosphere” (Floridi, 1999). The study of the phenomenology of
information can, therefore, help us trace the sources of the many imagin-
ings associated with the word “information.”
Nunberg’s essay is important to the approach this paper takes to a
philosophy of information, because the question “What is information?”
which might be taken as the foundation of such a philosophy, belongs as
much to our current phenomenon of information as does the idea of quan-
tiﬁcation. Information presents itself as a particular kind of thing; our im-
pression of it is of a kind of substance. Since the grammar of “substance”
and its cognates license conceptual explorations of what, precisely, the
properties of the stuff in question might be, it legitimates the question
“What is information?” Whereas the impression of information-as-substance
leads the popular imagination toward pursuits of remedies for the delete-
rious psychic effects of being overwhelmed by too much of the stuff, it di-
rects the theoretical and philosophical imagination toward puzzles posed
by information imagined as a coherent theoretical kind, that is, the sort of
thing about which general, theoretical knowledge may be gained. (Once
substance presents itself, the quest for essence is not far behind.)
According to Nunberg’s argument, the key properties of our abstract
impression of information-as-substance, those he calls the syntactic prop-
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erties of quantiﬁability, uniformity, and morselization (or boundedness),
and the semantic properties of objectivity and autonomy, “are simply the
reiﬁcations of the various principles of interpretation” (p. 116) we bring
to reading speciﬁc, historically contingent document forms, most notably
among them: the newspaper, the modern reference work, national dictio-
naries, and encyclopedias; travel guides, census and other statistical reports;
the printed schedules, work rules, and forms of modern managerial orga-
nizations; and the modern novel (pp. 115–116). Our various impressions
of information, he argues, “grow directly out of the material organization
of [these] informational genres” (p. 117). In addition, he notes, there arose
a set of institutions “charged with representing the modern world,” whose
manner of representation “closely mirrored” these document forms (p.
116). They include various kinds of public museums, especially those de-
voted to representations of ﬁne art, natural history, and science and indus-
try, in addition to department stores and “public libraries, great and small,
card catalogues, and the ‘library science’ (now ‘information science’) that
grew up along with them” (p. 116). Because the properties of our current
phenomenon of information that Nunberg reveals in his analysis of their
documentary and institutional roots pertain to the category of substance,
they lead, in spite of their contradictions and ambiguities, to ideas of in-
formation as a coherent theoretical kind. They lend a theoretical aura to
the question “What is information?”
There is another source, beyond the material organization of document
forms and their supporting institutions, of our phenomenon of informa-
tion. This second source has a venerable philosophical ancestry, and sever-
al remarks in Nunberg’s essay point in its direction, although he does not
address it directly. He notes that authors of “manifestos issued on behalf
of the new technologies” typically imagine the content of electronic media
as “a noble substance that is indifferent to the transformation of its vehi-
cles” (p. 107). Its nobility consists in its abstract, immaterial, and asocial
nature: it “will be preserved intact when its material and social supports are
stripped away” (p. 107), and it “doesn’t change its nature according to ei-
ther the medium it is stored in or the way it is represented” (p. 117). “In-
formation” in its abstract sense is the current name of this “noble substance,”
because information, whether speeding through electronic media or trans-
mitted at a more leisurely pace through print, is imagined as the content
of a message or document. The connection between this sense of informa-
tion and some deeply held philosophical convictions is suggested in Nun-
berg’s characterization of the phenomenon of information as “a kind of
intentional substance that is present in the world” (p. 110; emphasis added).
The reference to intentionality marks a connection between information-
al and mental substance. To imagine the information conveyed by a mem-
ber of the rapidly expanding universe of documents as abstract, noble doc-
ument content indifferent to the transformation of its vehicles and stripped
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of all material, institutional, and social supports is to imagine it as belong-
ing to the same ontological category as the immaterial, intentional, and
mental substance present to an individual mind in a state of understand-
ing that document. The document is imagined as the mere conveyance, or
channel, for the transmission of intentional substance from the mind of the
sender to the mind of the receiver, an idea implicit in Nunberg’s observa-
tion that according to cyberspace enthusiasts, thanks to the new digital tech-
nologies, the content of documents now “can be liberated and manipulat-
ed as a kind of pure essence.” John Perry Barlow, for example, is almost clear
about the ontology of the “complex and highly liquid patterns of ones and
zeros” ﬂowing through the Internet; once it becomes “the principal medi-
um of information conveyance, and perhaps eventually, the only one,” then
“all the goods of the Information Age—all of the expressions once con-
tained in books or ﬁlm strips or newsletters—will exist either as pure
thought or something very much like thought” (Barlow, 1994). Informa-
tion is thus already imagined, not only as material “voltage conditions dart-
ing around the Net at the speed of light” (ibid.), but also, modeled on a
venerable philosophical paradigm, as belonging to the same ontological
category as “immaterial and abstract representational entities, such as prop-
ositions, concepts, mental images, and the epistemic content of sentences
or other sorts of signiﬁers” (Frohmann, 2001, p. 16).
The idea of life breathed into the spoken word, printed text, or any
documentary form by mental activity is a central paradigm of the Western
philosophical tradition, and it persists to the present day.1  When this par-
adigm interacts with the impression of information as intentional sub-
stance—an impression that derives from the material properties of the
document forms and institutions analyzed by Nunberg—there arises a com-
plex and conﬂicted phenomenology of information, which crisscrosses
concepts of meaning, the content of documents, what their authors intend
in writing them, what a mind grasps in understanding them, and their in-
teractions. This complex phenomenon licenses a range of theoretical con-
troversies, among them: whether information inheres in documents or in
the minds that understand them; how intentional substance is related to
and how it can be transmitted through inert, dead, and lifeless matter; what
it is for a person to be informed; what it is for a document to be informing;
how the differences in the scope and range of the informativeness of doc-
uments may be explained; how we are to understand the relations between
various social phenomena and the production, circulation, and reception
of information.
Meaning, Information, and Practice
Nunberg’s approach is one example of a promising philosophical ap-
proach to information: rather than take for granted the legitimacy of the
question “What is information?”— thereby locating theories of information
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at the center of investigation—focus instead on the sources and legitima-
tion of the question itself. But other powerful models exist, and the one
suggested in this section derives from the later philosophy of Ludwig Witt-
genstein. It is well known that Wittgenstein often deﬂates philosophical
versions of questions of the form “What is X?” One such question, central
to his philosophical project, is “What is meaning?” His investigation of this
question is important for information studies because it is closely connect-
ed to the question “What is information?” Moreover, in troubling the ques-
tion of meaning, he targets the same deeply held philosophical conviction
from whence, it was argued above, our current impression of information
in large part derives.
Wittgenstein opens his Philosophical Investigations with a passage from
Augustine’s Confessions, where Augustine imagines how he learned language
as a child:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved
towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called
by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their in-
tention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural
language of all peoples. . . . Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in
their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to under-
stand what objects they signiﬁed; and after I had trained my mouth to
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.
Immediately following this passage, Wittgenstein remarks,
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence
of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name
objects—sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of
language we ﬁnd the roots of the following idea: Every word has a
meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for
which the word stands. (Wittgenstein, 1958, §1)
Wittgensteinian exegesis of this text is no less prodigious than that of
many other parts of his corpus; readers who wish to pursue it can refer to
Part I of Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding (Baker & Hacker, 1983).
The aim here is modest: to focus just on those aspects most useful to a phi-
losophy of information. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that Wittgenstein’s tar-
get is not full-blown theories of meaning. He speaks instead of “a particular
picture of the essence of human language,” distinguishing it from a particu-
lar idea rooted in it. The picture is that words stand for objects, and the idea
rooted in it is that the word’s meaning is the object for which the word stands.
Taken together, these two conceptions form a picture of language that pre-
cedes theories, as Baker and Hacker point out: “Augustine’s conception of
language is an Urbild. The family of philosophical accounts of meaning that
grow out of it are full-blown ‘theories’” (Baker & Hacker, 1983, p. 4). If Witt-
genstein is right in supposing that the Augustinian picture is a deeply seat-
ed philosophical conviction underlying theories of meaning, and if this pa-
392 library trends/winter 2004
per’s argument is plausible, that there is a close connection between the Au-
gustinian picture and an analogous picture of information, then it’s also
plausible that to uproot the ﬁrst, as Wittgenstein intends is, ipso facto, to
uproot the second—together with the philosophical theories of informa-
tion rooted in it. There is much at stake, therefore, for a philosophy of in-
formation, in Wittgenstein’s attack on Augustine’s Urbild.
One of the main features of the Augustinian picture that ties it closely
to an analogous picture of information is the role of mental activity in trans-
forming dead, lifeless matter—whether marks on a page, images on a com-
puter screen, or the spoken word—into meaningful signs. According to the
Augustinian picture, it takes a mind to make the connection between a sign
and its meaning. Because the sign, so it appears, stands for its meaning,
understanding a sign appears to consist in a mental projection of the sign
onto its sense by means of thought—an idea Wittgenstein addresses in many
places but especially lucidly in his comments on Frege’s impatience with
mathematical formalists:
Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that
the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the im-
portant, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not
treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege’s idea could be expressed thus:
the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dash-
es, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously
have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any prop-
osition: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would
be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no
adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the con-
clusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the
dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immateri-
al, with properties different from all mere signs. (Wittgenstein, 1969,
p. 4)
Baker and Hacker’s gloss on the Augustinian picture also emphasizes its
mentalistic aspects:
Since understanding seems to be a mental activity, we are inclined to
characterize the content of understanding as being “in the mind.”
Understanding consists in a mental association of a word with an ob-
ject. . . . The word is correlated with its meaning by means of the inten-
tion that it should stand for this thing. . . .Understanding is, as it were,
a form of mental pointing at an object, a way of projecting language
on to the world. . . . Meaning and understanding are activities separate
from the physical activity of uttering or writing words; they take place
in the medium of the mind, give life to language. . . . (Baker & Hack-
er, 1983, pp. 6–7)
The deeply seated conviction that life is breathed into language by the
mental act of connecting signs to meanings—a conviction Wittgenstein calls
“a disease of thinking which always looks for (and ﬁnds) what would be
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called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir”
(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 143)—is closely related to the idea that the infor-
mativeness of a document also requires the mental act of projecting its signs
onto their sense (or meaning). In other words, it takes thought to transform
documents from lifeless matter into living information. A document, so it
seems, can be informing only if the reader is mentally formed, a process imag-
ined as the content of the document becoming present to readers’ minds
when they are in the mental state of understanding the document. The
document itself seems to be just a disposable medium that simply transmits
the genuine object of theoretical desire: information itself, Nunberg’s noble,
intentional substance, present in the world as the content of documents,
and owing its indifference to the transformation of its vehicles to its onto-
logical status as mental substance.
This picture of information sows the seeds of theories of information.
By licensing appeals to the presence of the document’s content to a mind
in a state of understanding, it warrants mentalistic explanations of what it
is for a person to be informed by a document. It licenses explanations of
differences in the informativeness of documents by appealing to individu-
al differences in the properties of the mediating entity—the human mind—
that account for variations in the abilities of individual minds to success-
fully transform dead, lifeless marks on a page into an informing document,
such as the intelligence, degree of education, innate cognitive ability, and
so on, of the readers of documents. The idea that information is a theoret-
ical kind populates the world with subjects who pursue it, now familiar to
us as “information seekers,” a term of the art of library and information
science. When the informativeness of a document is seen as the content
present to a mind in a state of understanding it, then “information uses”
gain the stability they need to be counted, tabulated, and processed by sta-
tistical methods. Relations between various social phenomena and the pro-
duction, circulation, and reception of information can be similarly ex-
plained; for example, the popular view of the direct function between
increased access to information and the spread of democracy often appeals
to the rise of a literate, enlightened citizenry, on the assumption that with-
out the progressive development of the minds from whose mental acts the
informativeness of documents depends, the mere spread of the documents
themselves can have but little effect.2  The close connection between the
Augustinian picture of meaning and the mentalistic picture of information
is important, because insofar as being informed seems to consist in the
presence of meaning to consciousness, to deﬂate meaning as a theoretical
object is also to deﬂate information as a theoretical object.
Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Augustinian Urbild is to set beside it a
very simple, imagined use of language—a language-game—which is worth
quoting in full:
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Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping.
I give him a slip marked “ﬁve red apples.” He takes the slip to the shop-
keeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the
word “red” in a table and ﬁnds a colour sample opposite it; then he says
the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by
heart—up to the word “ﬁve” and for each number he takes an apple
of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and
similar ways that one operates with words.—“But how does he know
where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with
the word ‘ﬁve?’”—Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Ex-
planations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of
the word “ﬁve?”—No such thing was in question here, only how the
word “ﬁve” is used. (Wittgenstein, 1958, §1).
In this example, Wittgenstein erases all vestiges of the Augustinian pic-
ture of meaning that lies at the root of the idea that a mental act projects a
sign onto its sense. The shopkeeper moves directly, with no mental inter-
mediary, from the word “red” to the color sample, and then to the apple
matching it; he moves directly, with no mental intermediary, from the word
“ﬁve” to a rote utterance of the numerals from one to ﬁve, each time tak-
ing an apple from the drawer. In this picture, as Wittgenstein remarks, no
such thing as the meaning of a word is in question. It is a fact that human
beings operate with words as described. It is a fact that there exist such lan-
guage-games, or practices with words. “When we look at such simple forms
of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of
language disappears.” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 17)
The Augustinian picture assumes that there must be a mental interme-
diary between word and deed, because, otherwise, how could the shopkeep-
er know what he is to do? Words, after all, are arbitrary conventions, mere
marks on a slip of paper in this example, with no essential connection to the
world. Only a mind, we think, can make the kind of connection required.
The wonderful thing about a mind, it seems, is that it can correlate arbi-
trary symbols with meanings. Meanings are something like symbols, but dif-
ferent in a crucial respect: they are not arbitrary—they seem to reach right
out to the world by thought, a kind of mental projection or pointing. But
the idea of a mental pointing that correlates mental content present to
consciousness directly to the world is a superstition:
If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about
the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the
sign, then ﬁrst let us adopt the method . . . of replacing this mental
image by some outward object seen, e.g., a painted or modeled image.
Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the
written sign alone was dead?—In fact, as soon as you think of replac-
ing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image
thereby loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to
the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the men-
tal process which you needed for your purposes.) (p. 5)
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Wittgenstein’s point in this passage is made at many other places in his
writings. It can be easily adapted to the simple language-game of the shop-
keeper. If there is no problem about how the shopkeeper fetches a red ap-
ple on the basis of the presence to his mind of the meaning of the word “red,”
then why is there a problem of doing so just upon his looking at the word
“red”? To insist that the problem simply doesn’t arise for meanings is to
impute magical or occult properties to them. We are also tempted to im-
pute the same occult properties to rules when we try to explain meaning
by appeal to rules governing the use of language. Rules, like meanings, are
pictured as magical when imagined as anticipating what is in accordance
with them. Regarding the +1 rule for extending the series, 1,2,3 . . ., Witt-
genstein remarks: “The expression ‘The rule meant him to follow up 100
by 101’ makes it appear that this rule, as it was meant, foreshadowed all the
transitions which were to be made according to it. But the assumption of a
shadow of a transition does not get us any further, because it does not bridge
the gulf between it and the real transition. If the mere words of the rule
could not anticipate a future transition, no more could any mental act ac-
companying these words” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 143).
Wittgenstein’s pursuit of the myriad and labyrinthian ramiﬁcations of
the conceptual confusions surrounding the Augustinian picture of language
has generated a monument of philosophical exegesis. For the purposes of
this paper, it is enough to provide a brief sense of his argument and to ap-
ply it to our thinking about information. Wittgenstein’s description of the
simple language-game of the shopkeeper shows that, in philosophical reﬂec-
tion on what meaning itself might be, the idea of the presence to conscious-
ness of a particular kind of mental entity that attaches words, sentences, rules,
or other elements of a language to the world is idle. The upshot of his in-
vestigations is that when meant philosophically, the question “What is mean-
ing?” expresses a confusion. Once it is recognized that the shopkeeper acts
as described, then the generalized idea of meaning evaporates, thus elimi-
nating the source of philosophical angst about the deﬁnition, nature, or
essence of meaning. Meaning is not a coherent theoretical kind awaiting
explication. Wittgenstein deﬂates the very idea of a theory of meaning:
“meaning” is a garden-variety word whose purposes and uses are open to view.
Because “meaning” is grammatically related to “information” by virtue
of the unexciting truth that a meaningless sign can not be informing, sim-
ilar conclusions follow for a philosophy of information. If the shopkeeper
acts as described, we say he knows the meaning of the words “ﬁve,” “red,”
and “apples”—to say so is to know the meaning of “meaning.” And if the
shopkeeper’s knowledge of these words is shown by his actions, then it is
his actions that also show that the shopkeeper is informed by the phrase “ﬁve
red apples”—as opposed to a meaningless mark on the slip of paper. The
informativeness of the phrase has as little to do with any mental process as
does its meaningfulness. Once the philosophical idea of meaning as a theo-
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retical kind drops out of the picture of the shopkeeper’s way of operating
with words, so too does the corresponding idea of information. In neither
case is there anything like a particular kind of thing answering to the words
“meaning” and “information”: neither meaning nor information is a theo-
retical kind. Similarly, no substantive answers exist to the questions “What is
meaning?” and “What is information?”
When we look at Wittgenstein’s example, we do not see minds engaged
in cerebration but embodied persons engaged in activities of operating with
words. Wittgenstein calls such activities language-games; at other places, he
uses different terms: “To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sen-
tence means to understand a language. To understand a language means
to be master of a technique” (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 199). We can bring these
ideas together under the category of practice: for Wittgenstein, attention to
the actual practices with language deﬂates philosophical ideas of meaning
by exposing them as occult and magical fantasies of essential connections
undergirding language use. And since informativeness follows from mean-
ingfulness, attention to practice also deﬂates ideas of information as the
equally occult, noble, and intentional substance by virtue of which a docu-
ment is informing.
Wittgenstein’s examples of simple language games are especially use-
ful for thinking about information because they often involve, as in the case
of the shopkeeper, familiar items such as written words on slips of paper,
color charts, tables, geometrical ﬁgures, and so on (see especially Part I of
The Brown Book; Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 77–125). Many of his cases there-
fore involve practices with documents. Just as Wittgenstein’s treatment of the
Augustinian picture shifts our attention away from mentalistic pictures of
meaning and toward practices with language, so too does it shift our atten-
tion away from mentalistic pictures of information and toward practices with
documents. The Wittgensteinian perspective heralds a shift from theories of
information to descriptions of documentary practices.
Certain properties of practices are especially salient in such descrip-
tions. The ﬁrst is materiality: since documents exist in some material form,
their materiality conﬁgures practices with them. (The shopkeeper’s lan-
guage game excludes persons afﬂicted with color blindness from learning
and engaging in it because it involves color samples.) A familiar example
of constraints imposed by the materiality of documents is the difﬁculty of
coordinating meetings when committee members rely upon their “hard
copy” of the same Web document, each with unique pagination, thus ex-
posing a minor advantage of typographical ﬁxity, a feature of the printing
press championed by Eisenstein (1979) and challenged by Johns (1998).
Brown and Duguid (2000) provide similar examples. A second property of
documentary practices is how deeply embedded they are in institutions.
Much of the authority of the informativeness of documents depends on the
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institutional sites of their production, a point made by Foucault in his dis-
cussion of the importance of institutions to the formation of enunciative
modalities (Foucault, 1972, pp. 51–52). A third property is social discipline:
documentary practices, like most others, require training, teaching, correc-
tion, and other disciplinary measures; the point is reinforced by the role
of training in many of Wittgenstein’s language-games and emphasized by
Foucault’s link between disciplinary apparatus and the ﬁeld of documen-
tation (Foucault, 1979, pp. 189–194, 197). A fourth property is historicity:
practices arise, develop, decline, and vanish—all under speciﬁc historical
circumstances. These four constraining properties of documentary prac-
tices are only analytical notions; full descriptions of such practices will fea-
ture interactions between some or all of them. Nor is this short list meant
to be exhaustive. But the ideas of materiality, institutions, social discipline,
and history provide a useful beginning for a philosophy of information
whose point of departure is the concept of documentary practices. The next
section presents two historical examples from the history of early modern
science to show that a document becomes informing only given certain kinds
of documentary practices.
Writing the Book of Nature
Something new, we know, occurred in the early-sixteenth- to the late-
eighteenth century with respect to our knowledge of the natural world. The
story—the narrative of the scientiﬁc revolution—has been told many times.
A popular version goes something like this: inspired by thinkers such as
Bacon and experimenters such as Boyle and Galileo, the natural philoso-
phers of the period opened their eyes to the natural world, gathering ob-
servations to support inductive generalizations, thereby rejecting their pre-
decessors’ habit of drawing deductive conclusions from Aristotelian
“essences” or “natures” (for a dissenting view, see Shapin, 1996). As a fa-
miliar metaphor would have it, they turned from the books of the philoso-
phers to the book of nature. Robert Boyle made his reading preferences
quite clear: “. . . I could be very well content to be thought to have scarce
looked upon any other book than that of nature” (quoted in Shapin, 1984,
p. 496). Peter Dear, whose analysis of the relationship between experiment
and documentation is very useful for understanding the historical dimen-
sions of documentary practices, puts it this way:
Historians routinely refer to Baconianism, the Royal Society, and the
metaphor of reading the book of nature . . . to argue that the seven-
teenth century saw a move towards discovering nature through the
senses, using observation and experiment. Certainly, something hap-
pened to experience in the seventeenth century; talk of experimental
and experiential demonstration, or sometimes “ocular” demonstra-
tion—culminating in the term “experimental philosophy”—rapidly
became widespread. (Dear, 1991, p. 135)
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The metaphor of the book of nature can be recast from the perspective of
an admittedly anachronistic philosophy of information: in the period of the
scientiﬁc revolution, natural philosophers opened their eyes to observe the
information nature had to offer—the noble substance inscribed in the book
of nature by nature itself. When present to minds tuned to sensory experi-
ence, observation, and experiment, nature’s information is reinscribed in
the burgeoning scientiﬁc documentation of the age, thus precipitating a
seventeenth-century version of an information revolution.
It is not so easy, however, to transcribe the book of nature into the books
of mankind. The story gets more complicated when institutionalized doc-
umentary practices are taken into account. For the natural philosophers
of the time, it was not at all obvious how to document the new kinds of
observations—especially those generated by lashing nature to the rack of
experiment; as Francis Bacon put it, phenomena revealed by “nature un-
der constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by art and the hand of man
she is forced out of her natural state, squeezed, and moulded” (Bacon, 1960,
p. 25)—as revealing nature’s secrets rather than freaks spawned by myste-
rious manipulations of fantastic instruments by devotees of a secret cult.
While it is common today to accept that laboratory phenomena produced
by an elite cadre expert in the techniques of recondite apparatus can speak
for nature, it was anything but common in the mid-seventeenth century. The
idea that an event produced by experiment could generate truths of nature
was entirely new. From the perspective of a PI, the natural philosophers of
the seventeenth century faced the challenge of how to make their written
reports of observations informative or how to convey the information inscribed
in the book of nature.
The difﬁculty may be seen as a case of the familiar Aristotelian prob-
lem of the possibility and legitimacy of a science of the individual. Experi-
mental results are singular, individual events. But Aristotelian science de-
rives its conclusions from universal principles. These principles draw their
certainty and authority from common experience; they are what everyone knows,
such as “Heavy bodies fall,” or “The sun rises in the east.” In Aristotelian
science, an “experience” was “a universal statement of how things are” (Dear,
1995, p. 22)—“a statement of how things happen in nature, rather than a state-
ment of how something had happened on a particular occasion” (p. 4). And,
although the truth of such experience is known by the senses, “one did not
need to have acquired such experiences personally in order to use them in
argumentation, provided that they were commonly accepted, either through
daily familiarity or through the statements of a weighty authority” (p. 22).
The stability of such “experience” rested upon the obviousness of the universal
statement, which was underwritten by common consent and which warrant-
ed its use in deductive reasoning—the Aristotelian way of true science. Since
singular, individual, historical events cannot reveal how nature behaves
normally, they cannot provide grounds for natural knowledge. Moreover,
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because occasional deviations from the regular course of nature are not
ruled out by the Aristotelian conception, a ready explanation for laborato-
ry events inaccessible to common experience was available: “they might be
classiﬁed as ‘monsters’ or even ‘miracles’” (p. 14).
How, then, did the natural philosophers of the early seventeenth cen-
tury, dedicated as they were to observing nature through new instruments
(such as Galileo’s telescope) and forcing nature to yield new phenomena
through new devices (such as Boyle’s air-pump; see Shapin & Schaffer,
1985), manage to make their claims credible when reports of singular his-
torical events had no epistemic status? “How could ‘experiences’ be estab-
lished as common property,” Dear asks, “if most people lacked direct ac-
cess to them?” (1995, p. 59). The answer relies upon his insight that
experiment and its documentation are closely linked. Scientiﬁc literary
practice, he argues, is “a crucial feature of scientiﬁc practice as a whole . . .
an account of an experiment is an essential part of its performance” (Dear,
1991, p. 135). Documents are credible only given certain kinds of documen-
tary practices, and in the early seventeenth century, “epistemology, meth-
od, and text were woven together in the assumptions of that dominant scho-
lastic pedagogy which took Aristotle as its touchstone of legitimacy” (Dear,
1991, p. 137). The purported “observations” yielded by experiments and
new instruments had, somehow, to be documented as Aristotelian “common
experiences.” Since the only discursive resources available to convey the
information revealed by nature to the private experiences of specialists
working with mysterious instruments were deeply embedded in the insti-
tutions of Aristotelian scholarship, the manufacture of credibility fell to the
documentary task of mutating Aristotelian discursive resources such that
the discrete observations of a few could express the common experiences
of the many. It was not enough simply to present the observations of an
experiment, or the new kinds of observations made available by new kinds
of instruments, as if they belonged to a book written by nature itself. In other
words, when it came to the manufacture of knowledge, it was not possible
to suppose that nature’s information could speak for itself. The experiment
had ﬁrst to be “constructed linguistically as a historical account of a speciﬁc
event that acts as a warrant for the truth of a universal knowledge-claim”
(Dear, 1995, p. 6). The unwritten, undocumented experiment could not
stand on its own: “For the singular experiment to stand for the universal
experience, an appropriate kind of argumentative framework needs to be
in place, explicitly or implicitly, within which it can play that role” (Dear,
1991, p. 162). Such linguistic construction, however, took much labor, es-
pecially for scholars working within the documentary practices of scholas-
tic science and pedagogy. How did they struggle to make their documents
credible? Posed in the terms of a philosophy of information, how did they
manage to make their documents informative?
One technique was to draw upon the familiar literary device of the
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geometrical problema. Geometry was a model of the Aristotelian ideal “to
have principles, or premises, that were evident and therefore immediately
conceded by all. In the case of geometry, Euclid’s ‘common opinions’—
what Aristotle called ‘axioms’—represent the concept precisely” (Dear,
1995, p. 42). If the familiar, institutionalized literary form of the geometri-
cal construction could be used successfully to document empirical state-
ments as clearly evident as Euclid’s “common opinions,” then the “common
consent” enjoyed by the latter could be transferred to the former. More-
over, the already recognized geometrical expertise of the writer is extend-
ed at the same time to natural-scientiﬁc investigations. The new sciences
of astronomy and optics, although driven by new instruments, were espe-
cially amenable to the geometrical form of documentation. The transpar-
ency of the geometrical construction, where “in following its steps one sees
the outcome generated inevitably before one’s eyes; even recourse to com-
pass and ruler is unnecessary” (p. 60), was used to link the procedures and
outcomes of optical experiences: “Just as constructions in geometry were
generated from postulates that expressed conceded possibilities, so the use
of a geometrical paradigm served to re-create unfamiliar experience by
generating it from familiar experience—that is, easily picturable operations”
(p. 60). By yoking the documentary practices of the geometrical problema
to the presentation of their experiments, the contemporary natural philos-
ophers could enact a literary performance of the experiment such that the
experimental phenomena—the observations—could become as evident
and as obvious as geometrical axioms. The problem, says Dear, was clear:
“The deductive, demonstrative model of natural knowledge meant that
empirical statements had to play the part of axioms; that is, they had to look
like universal statements of the way everyone knows how things are—like
geometrical axioms” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). Nature’s information could
emerge only as an effect of prevailing documentary practices, together with
the social and pedagogical disciplines that maintained them. Far from be-
ing a noble substance indifferent to the transformation of its vehicles, the
information about nature conveyed by the documents of seventeenth-cen-
tury astronomy and optics emerged only as an effect of the labor expend-
ed on adapting the existing conventions of Aristotelian documentary prac-
tices to new situations. The book of nature turns out to be a
multiple-authored product of socially disciplined literary practices. Written
according to institutionalized documentary practices, it is informative; writ-
ten by nature itself, it is unintelligible.
A second technique used to render empirical statements with the ob-
viousness of Aristotelian ﬁrst principles was multiple repetition. This strat-
agem merits mention especially because its use was not driven by anything
like our modern understanding of the role of repeated experimental tri-
als. The aim was not to strengthen hypothetical claims, but to place an
observation in the same class as the “experiences” authenticated by com-
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mon consent, many of which, like “The sun rises in the east,” are exemplars
of multiple repetition. Dear explains that the
justiﬁcation of multiple repetition has nothing to do with epistemolog-
ical problems of induction; it concerns simply the avoidance of decep-
tion by the senses or by choice of an atypical instance, so as to ensure a
reliable report of how nature actually behaves “always or for the most
part,” as Aristotle put it. The relevant aspects of nature are themselves
neither opaque nor capricious—if they were, there could be no ques-
tion of making a science of them by having their characterizations pass
into “common assent.” (Dear, 1991, p. 139)
The idea was not to record the degree of agreement between the outcomes
of speciﬁc historical events repeated many times, but to describe experimen-
tal phenomena in the manner characteristic of scholastic documentation
of ﬁrst principles.
This technique was deployed by Galileo.
Instead of describing a speciﬁc experiment or set of experiments car-
ried out at a particular time, together with a detailed quantitative record
of the outcomes, Galileo merely says that, with apparatus of a certain
sort, he found the results to agree exactly with his theoretical assump-
tions—having, he says, repeated the trial “a full hundred times.” He had
shortly before claimed to have done this “often.” Both phrases are just
ways of saying, in effect, “again and again as much as you like.” Galileo
thus establishes the authenticity of the experience that falling bodies
do behave as he asserts by basing it on the memory of many instances—
a multiplicity of unspeciﬁed instances adding up to experiential con-
viction. (Dear, 1995, p. 125)
If successful, Galileo’s strategy presents his experimental observations as
typical. The literary appeal to typicality is a mode of documentation: it is
the use of a “familiar rhetorical tactic of appealing to common experi-
ence . . . to establish . . . empirical assertions, appropriately, as things that
‘everyone knows’” (p. 90). Galileo does not provide narrative reports of
speciﬁc instances of what he had done and seen at speciﬁc times, but in-
stead tells his readers what happens in the kind of situation he presents; he
documents a recurring phenomenon of nature: a type, one constructed whol-
ly in keeping with Aristotelian documentary practices. The documentary
transformation of experimental statements into “experience” of how na-
ture typically behaves thus converts empirical assertions into Aristotelian
ﬁrst principles: “Galileo’s use of experience [is] tantamount to the invo-
cation of thought experiments: the reader is reassured that the world’s
working in a particular way is entirely to be expected, entirely consonant
with ordinary events” (Dear, 1995, p. 126). Employing once again the
anachronistic language of information, we can say that the information
about nature emerges as an effect of these institutionalized documentary
practices. Far from conveying nature’s information—the noble substance
ﬁrst presented by nature to the newly tuned minds of natural philosophers
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who then communicated it to others through writing—the documentary
practices of the period constituted it.
Dear’s investigations reveal the role, at a particular time and place, of
the institutions that disciplined the manner in which the science of nature
was documented, and how they provided a particular set of discursive re-
sources for the articulation of scientiﬁc truth. Different times and differ-
ent places exhibit different kinds of documentary practices and different
kinds of institutions—think of the corporate form of the scientiﬁc enter-
prise in our own time (Galison & Hevly, 1992). A nice contrast to the con-
tinental natural philosophers’ deployments of Aristotelian practices of in-
scribing nature is the production of knowledge in Restoration England.
Working in the absence of the strong scholastic pedagogical and academic
institutions of their continental counterparts, Robert Boyle and the Fellows
of the early Royal Society could legitimate alternatives to demonstrative
methods of knowledge production modeled after logic and geometry. True
to their Baconian practice of building knowledge from the certiﬁed occur-
rence, at a particular time and place, of the granular, theory-resistant fact
of nature rather than from the certainty of axioms or “essences,” they saw
the form of Aristotelian accounts of scientiﬁc results as a surrender to dis-
credited authority. Rejecting certainty as the standard of natural knowledge,
they adopted the more modest criterion of high probability. Steven Shap-
in puts it this way:
Physical hypotheses were provisional and revisable; assent to them was
not necessary, as it was to mathematical demonstration; and physical
science was, to varying degrees, removed from the realm of the demon-
strative. The probabilistic conception of physical knowledge was not
regarded as a regrettable retreat from more ambitious goals; it was
celebrated by its proponents as a wise rejection of failed dogmatism.
The quest for necessary and universal assent to physical propositions
was seen as improper and impolitic. (Shapin, 1984, p. 483)
Having abandoned Aristotelian conventions for articulating natural knowl-
edge, the members of the Royal Society did not attempt to make their sin-
gular experiment stand for universal experience. Their problem was dif-
ferent: how to court trust in reports of what had happened on particular
occasions under highly contrived circumstances using recondite apparatus.
“The probabilistic model of Boyle,” Dear writes, “required a category of the
‘matter of fact,’ the legitimacy of which depended precisely on accredited,
and therefore speciﬁable, occurrences” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). Continental
and English practices were radically different: “Boyle did not use axiomat-
ic deductive argumentative structures, which were supposed to constitute
science in an Aristotelian sense, whereas Galileo and the Jesuits did. The
difference is of great signiﬁcance. . . . Boyle reported singular historical
events; they needed universal statements of behavior even when giving his-
torical accounts by way of collateral” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). To the continental
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philosophers, a “historical report of a speciﬁc event, of the kind that Boyle
wrote endlessly, would have been scientiﬁcally meaningless; it would have
been philosophical antiquarianism” (Dear, 1995, p. 209).
The literary practices of scientiﬁc report writing of the early period of
the Royal Society were therefore quite different from the scholastic prac-
tices pursued on the continent. Since the aim was to engender the read-
er’s trust that the singular, historical event presented in the scientiﬁc report
was indeed as it was purported to be—that it was a fact of nature, a matter
of fact, rather than a man-made artifact of the laboratory—a literary tech-
nique was designed to put the reader at the scene, to have the reader per-
form a virtual witnessing of the event occurring in the laboratory (Shapin
& Schaffer, 1985, pp. 60–65). Boyle realized that if “one wrote experimen-
tal reports in the correct way, the reader could take on trust that these things
happened. Further, it would be as if that reader had been present at the
proceedings. He would be recruited as a witness and be put in a position
where he could validate experimental phenomena as matters of fact” (pp.
62–63). There developed a style of writing that presented the experiment
by an “ornate sentence structure, with appositive clauses piled on top of
each other,” in order “to convey circumstantial details and to give the im-
pression of verisimilitude” (p. 63). This ornate rather than succinct style
was required to present simultaneously, in one snapshot as it were, all of
the details required for virtual witnessing: “Elaborate sentences, with cir-
cumstantial details encompassed within the conﬁnes of one grammatical
entity, might mimic that immediacy and simultaneity of experience afforded
by pictorial representations” (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 64). Dear makes
the same point this way: “The credentials that established the actuality of
the event were provided by surrounding the description by a wealth of cir-
cumstantial detail. This detail generally included information regarding
time, place, and participants, together with extraneous remarks about the
experience, all serving to add verisimilitude” (Dear, 1995, pp. 229–230).
A second feature of this literary style was modesty, which was not only a
documentary performance of the very qualities of the civility and gentle-
manly posture of the actual witnesses Boyle brought to the real experimental
scene to assure others of the veracity of experimental phenomena, but also
an exemplar of the properly Baconian nondogmatic attitude appropriate
to inductive and probabilistic, rather than demonstrative and axiomatic,
assertions of natural science. Here is Boyle’s advice to his nephew on the
proper style for venturing what he calls “opinions” in the experimental
report: “in almost every one of the following essays I . . . speak so doubtingly,
and use so often, perhaps, it seems, it is not improbable, and other such expres-
sions, as argue a difﬁdence of the truth of the opinions I incline to, and
that I should be so shy of laying down principles, and sometimes of so much
as venturing at explications” (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 67). Immodesty
is a sign of scholastic dogmatism; it signals the performance of individual
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conjecture. Modesty is the appropriate intellectual posture of a natural
scientist who would soberly and with circumspection document the matters
of fact that nature presents. The documentary practices of the Reformation
transform readers into participants in a literary performance of the exper-
iment through the eyes of credible witnesses. Stated once again from the
perspective of a philosophy of information: nature’s information emerges
from the documentary practices of the early Royal Society as a singular
historical event authenticated and certiﬁed as a matter of fact that did indeed
occur as documented.
For both the Fellows of the Royal Society and their continental peers,
the question of whether their reports were scientiﬁcally meaningful—
hence, whether they communicated the information nature had to give—
depended on institutionally disciplined and historically contingent docu-
mentary practices. On the continent, the documentary practices of
scholasticism had to be exploited under new conditions, whereas in Refor-
mation England the relevant practices ﬁrst had to be created. The book of
nature, it turns out, is not only hospitable to a wide variety of human au-
thors and institutions, but also incorporates novelty, conﬂict, and strife.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to point toward some useful avenues for phi-
losophizing about information. Much more work needs to be done to fol-
low up the suggestions presented here, in what is intended merely as a pro-
legomenon to a philosophy of information. Two main directions have been
indicated.
The ﬁrst direction points toward a phenomenology of information and
away from a philosophical theory of information. Nunberg’s essay is pre-
sented as a useful example of a way of thinking about information, one that
shifts our attention away from questions of what information itself, as a
theoretical kind, might be, and toward questions of how, in both our own
but also at other times and places, the phenomenon of information is con-
structed. A promising conclusion for thinking about information philosoph-
ically is that a phenomenology of information implies that the very ques-
tion “What is information?” is itself an aspect of a contemporary cultural
space in which information is conceived as a theoretical kind—the sort of
thing about which it makes sense to ask such a question in a philosophico-
theoretical vein. More studies along the lines of the cultural phenomenol-
ogy practiced by Nunberg should help us gain a broader, and certainly
historically deeper, understanding of how an underlying picture of infor-
mation arises as the self-sufﬁcient sort of substance about whose nature it
makes sense to theorize.
The second fruitful direction is a pursuit of the implications of Wittgen-
steinian ideas about language-games, or language-practices. The chief im-
plications are that the study of practices with documents should yield a more
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promising set of concepts for thinking philosophically about information
than studies centered upon a theoretical, philosophical excogitation of the
nature of information. The reason for this conclusion is that a Wittgenstein-
ian approach suggests that practices and documents—by which we mean
inscriptions, occasioned utterances, and the wide variety of records that
circulate in a myriad of formats—are more fundamental concepts than
information. Attention to practices with documents reveals how it is that
particular documents, at particular times and places and in particular ar-
eas of the social and cultural terrain, become informative. Wittgenstein
himself was not interested in pursuing the variations or historical contin-
gencies of the many social and political forces that conﬁgure practices. But
once they are seen as fundamental, then the genie is out of the bottle: the
informativeness of documents, when recognized as dependent on practices,
is also dependent on what shapes and conﬁgures them. The promising
directions to take to look for the conﬁguring factors are the materiality of
the documents studied, their histories, the institutions in which they are
embedded, and the social discipline shaping practices with them.
The brief examples presented here from the early history of modern
science are intended to indicate some of the institutional factors and his-
torical contingencies that must be taken into account to show how scientiﬁc
documents become informative. Examples from science are especially ger-
mane to an approach to information that begins from Wittgensteinian ideas
about language-practices, because the information nature conveys is a par-
adigm case of objective, culturally independent, epistemic content. If any
sort of information were to be a noble substance independent of the trans-
formations of its vehicles, this would be it. Social studies of science show that
even scientiﬁc information depends for its emergence on culturally speciﬁc,
historically determined, and institutionally disciplined documentary prac-
tices. If the case can be made here, it is much easier to make it elsewhere.
An implication of a focus on documentary practices for a philosophy
of information is that such a philosophy is subordinate to a philosophy of
documentation. Informativeness is not the only property of documentary
practices worthy of study. Many practices with documents have little, if any-
thing, to do with informing anyone about anything. An example is the role
of popular music in articulating social difference in youth culture (Frohm-
ann, 2001). The uses of such documents are many and deserving of study
even when their informativeness is not the issue. Social studies of science
and sociological studies of knowledge production provide further examples,
such as those that rely on concepts like trading zones (Galison, 1997) and
boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989)—where the idiom of convey-
ing information is not rich enough to capture the role of such documents
in coordinating work among members of different social worlds. Contem-
porary information studies owe much to the documentalist movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rayward, 1975; Rayward,
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1991; Buckland, 1996; Rayward, 1997), but documentation as envisaged
here covers more territory than information studies. Although the subject
of this issue of Library Trends is the PI, the title of this paper signals its in-
tention to recuperate and rethink the early documentalists’ concern for
documentary practices, and to situate the philosophy of information as but
one, although important, aspect of a philosophy of documentation.
A ﬁnal word concerns the historical imperative for a PI. Some think-
ers, prominent among them Luciano Floridi, Rafael Capurro, and Michael
Eldred, believe that a philosophy of information is especially urgent in the
digital age. The claim is that because of the expanding “infosphere” (Flo-
ridi, 1999) or the “digital casting of being” (Capurro; Eldred), the need for
a new digital ontology constitutes an imperative to philosophize anew about
information. The implication of a philosophy of documentation as present-
ed here dissents. Documentation recognizes as urgent an imperative to
study ancient, medieval, or early modern documentary practices as those
that feature electronic documents. What we do with electronic documents,
how such practices are conﬁgured, and what they do to us are eminently
worthy of study. But the digital form of contemporary documents creates
no special philosophical imperatives, since the concept of documentary
practices was there all along.
Notes
1. A vigorous e-mail correspondence on the JESSE listserv in the spring of 2002 attests to the
strength of the paradigm in library and information science (LIS). The chief protagonists
were Loet Leydesdorff and Tom Wilson, with the latter championing the Cartesian view
that mental representations, such as those present to the mind in the state of understand-
ing meanings, inhabit an immaterial realm. According to Wilson, the material properties
of documents that account for the squiggles of print that constitute their texts, the curves
that constitute their graphs, and so on, are dead, inert, and meaningless in themselves,
because they are simply material. It takes minds to breathe life into them; only when the
mind interprets these marks does “meaning” come into being. (Unlike some of his LIS
colleagues who would use the word “information” as he uses “meaning,” Wilson reserves
the former for the dead, inert graphemes.)
2. This popular view is refuted in a work whose analysis of the materiality of writing is ger-
mane to the themes of this paper: “an ever-widening educational apparatus has always
secured power and privilege for a small number to the exclusion of many,” and “[w]herever
we look, in every period, social stratiﬁcation presides over the history of literacy”(Goldberg,
1990, pp. 47–48).
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